Nepal at a Crossroads: Gen Z Protests and the Battle for Democratic Renewal

—Tauqueer Ali Sabri

 

Introduction

The stage is set for elections in Nepal on 5 March to choose the next federal government. The polls were called early following the Gen Z–led demonstrations in the Himalayan nation last September, which erupted over a social media ban and deeper concerns about entrenched corruption and nepotism within the political elite.

A total of 77 people were killed when police opened fire on protesters in Kathmandu and other cities. Amid escalating unrest, Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli resigned on 9 September 2025, stepping down from his coalition government under intense public and political pressure.

Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nepal, Sushila Karki, was subsequently appointed Interim Prime Minister by President Ram Chandra Poudel. Prime Minster Shushila Karki, Interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki moved quickly to stabilize the political environment after assuming office, framing the timely conduct of elections as essential to restoring constitutional order and public confidence. She prioritized three immediate steps: reactivating key state institutions that had been paralyzed during the unrest, ensuring administrative continuity across provinces, and directing the Election Commission to prepare an accelerated electoral timetable.

Karki convened all-party meetings to build consensus around the election date, but several mainstream parties were reluctant to fully cooperate. Some questioned the legitimacy of an interim government overseeing the polls, while others were wary of losing bargaining leverage in a rapidly shifting political landscape. There were also attempts to delay procedural decisions in parliament and challenge executive directives through legal and political channels.

Despite these obstacles, Karki maintained that postponement would deepen instability and erode democratic credibility. Her government increased security coordination to prevent further unrest, initiated dialogue with civil society and youth groups to reduce tensions and publicly committed to neutrality in the electoral process. By projecting the interim administration as a caretaker rather than a political contender, she sought to reassure both domestic stakeholders and international observers that the elections would be conducted in a free and credible manner.

Post Gen Z Political Landscape and Political Parties

In the aftermath of the Gen Z–led protests, Nepal’s major political parties pushed themselves to internal consultations, strategy sessions, and public conventions in response to the Gen Z protesters as well as to prepare for the March election.

Ten communist parties, including the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist), announced their unification at a conference in Kathmandu, forming the Nepali Communist Party under the leadership of Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Madhav Kumar Nepal was appointed co-coordinator. Planned outreach program on social justice, federalism, and youth engagement to reclaim their political image in the masses, this is in response to Gen-Z protests and the rising public skepticism toward traditional elites. But largely not able change the leadership or policies, which can galvanize the common people.

The Nepali Congress also convened a series of central working committee meetings to address internal factionalism and recalibrate its reform narrative, with younger leaders pushing for clearer anti-corruption commitments and organizational renewal. In the scope of electing new leaders to lead the Party, Gagan Kumar Thapa became President of the Nepali Congress, tasked with the assignment of leading the Party in this election. There are mixed reactions about Gagan Thapa, with people looking to him as a pragmatic leader to address the current challenges in the country as well in the party, while others feel this is a continuation of the old system.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) held provincial-level cadre conferences to consolidate its base and defend its governance records, while also reviewing coalition strategies in light of the political fallout from the protests. This was a result of the direct heat of the Gen Z-led protest care of which the then Prime Minister of the country was forced to resign and his ministerial colleagues escaped from the capital to escape the wrath of the protesters. The 11th General Convention of the CPN-UML was held in December 2025, where K.P. Sharma Oli was re-elected as chairman. Before the protests, Oli was at his peak in the politics of Nepal. However, there were scant changes in his political program to address the concerns of the people. It looks like Oli still believes in the old ways of running the party, where party members/comrades are sufficient to garner votes in this election.

The newer political actors, such as the Rastriya Swatantra Party, capitalized on the protest momentum through town hall meetings, digital assemblies, and youth conventions in major urban centers.  These gatherings emphasized transparency, merit-based governance, and institutional accountability.

Cross-party dialogues were also held, both at formal and informal levels, to discuss electoral reforms, security arrangements, and the role of the interim administration in ensuring credible polls. Civil society forums, university debates, and policy conferences further amplified discussions around federal restructuring, corruption oversight, and economic restructuring, signalling that the pre-election period has become a space not only for coalition negotiation but also for broader public contestation over the future direction of Nepal’s democratic project.

Significant Issues in the Election

The protests in Nepal last year clearly exposed the acuteness of frustration among young people over deep-rooted corruption, limited economic opportunities, and the persistent dominance of patronage-driven politics, especially where is sparse space for the common people to grab any opportunity emerging out of the system. What began as opposition to specific government decisions quickly evolved into a broader expression of generational anger at a system perceived to favor political insiders while offering little space for merit, transparency, or dignified employment. For many young Nepalis facing unemployment at home or compelled to migrate abroad, the demonstrations became a vehicle to demand accountability, institutional reform, and a reorientation of national priorities toward inclusive economic development and democratic integrity.

Since 2015, Nepal has had eight different governments, showing frequent leadership changes among the country’s three main political parties. Power has often shifted between the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). Coalition governments have often broken down soon after they were formed. Most of these changes were not due to major ideological differences but because of shifting alliances, internal party conflicts, and political strategies to maintain power in parliament.

This pattern has contributed to policy discontinuity and administrative uncertainty, complicating long-term economic planning and federal implementation. While Nepal’s constitutional framework has remained intact, the repeated reconfiguration of governments has reinforced public perceptions of elite bargaining politics detached from everyday socio-economic concerns. The result is a clear contradiction: democracy continues to function, but people are increasingly frustrated with unstable governments and the lack of real structural reforms.

Economic issues are central to politics for the people of Nepal because Nepal’s economy faces persistent challenges. Remittance money sent home by migrant workers accounts for over a quarter of the GDP, underlining how deeply the economy depends on workers abroad rather than domestic job creation. Youth unemployment is high, with rates around 20 per cent driving many young people to seek work overseas and amplifying public frustration with the lack of opportunities at home. Domestic growth has been modest, with GDP expanding around 4–5 per cent recently, while agriculture still employs most of the workforce but contributes much less to economic output.

Major parties have responded with promises to boost job creation and economic diversification, but these commitments are weighed against structural issues like remittance dependency, weak industrial growth, and limited investment in productive sectors, making economic reform a key battleground in the campaign.

Corruption and accountability have become central themes in Nepal’s election discourse, particularly in the aftermath of several high-profile scandals that have damaged public trust in mainstream parties. Recent years have seen controversies related to public procurement irregularities, cooperative financial fraud, and alleged misuse of state resources by politically connected actors. Investigations into fake refugee documentation networks and corruption within development projects have further intensified public scrutiny of political elites. These scandals have reinforced perceptions that governance is shaped by patronage networks rather than institutional transparency, contributing to declining confidence in established actors such as the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist). Civil society organizations and media investigations have repeatedly highlighted weaknesses in oversight bodies and slow judicial processes, making accountability a decisive electoral issue.

In response, anti-corruption narratives have gained momentum, particularly among urban and youth voters. It will be interesting to observe which political parties benefit most from this segment. In the 2022 general election, the Rastriya Swatantra Party built its campaign around promises of transparency and secured around 12 per cent of the vote. In the current election, the RSP has expanded its base; the Mayor of Kathmandu, Balendra Shah, joined the party and was declared its prime ministerial candidate. Balendra has emerged as a prominent figure in the digital space and a trending political leader. He and his party are attempting to position themselves as saviours of Nepal, often portraying other political parties and leaders as ineffective, an approach that reflects a certain political assertiveness. There are parallels with the rise of the Aam Aadmi Party in India, which emerged from an anti-corruption movement with similar slogans and positioning. At the same time, the RSP has distributed a significant number of tickets to candidates who previously belonged to mainstream parties.

All major political parties are campaigning intensively for the 5 March election in Nepal, combining roadshows, mass rallies, and door-to-door outreach with a renewed messaging strategy shaped by the post–Gen Z political climate. Gagan Thapa of the Nepali Congress is contesting from Sarlahi-4 in Madhesh Province, projecting himself as both youth-oriented and experienced. Former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, now leading the unified Nepali Communist Party, is contesting from Rukum East and recently addressed a major rally in Rolpa as part of his final outreach push; notably, eight parties formally unified under his leadership in December 2025, with more than 20 additional groups joining thereafter. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli is contesting from Jhapa-5 and focusing on constituency-level engagement.

The contest has also sharpened around newer and regional actors. Rabi Lamichhane of the Rastriya Swatantra Party is again contesting from Chitwan-2, while former Kathmandu mayor Balendra Shah, now the RSP’s prime ministerial candidate, is running from Jhapa-5—turning that constituency into a symbolic battle between established leadership and generational change. Rajendra Prasad Lingden of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party is contesting from Jhapa-3, while Upendra Yadav of the Janata Samajbadi Party and Chandrakant Raut of the Janamat Party are contesting from Saptari-3 and Saptari-2, respectively. Several interim ministers have resigned to join the race, including Kul Man Ghising (Kathmandu-3), Bablu Gupta (Siraha-1), and Mahabir Pun (Myagdi-1, as an independent), reflecting how this election has drawn both established leaders and reform-oriented figures into a highly competitive and symbolically charged contest.

Politics of social justice and inclusive space

In Nepal’s electoral landscape, the debates around ethnic federalism continue to animate political discourse. While the federal model was designed to address long-standing exclusion of Janajati, Dalit, Madhesi, and other marginalized communities, critics argue that implementation has fallen short of the Constitution’s inclusive promises. Questions persist over equitable access to state institutions, representation in bureaucracy and security forces, and effective fiscal devolution to provinces. As a result, the politics of social justice and inclusion in this election is not merely symbolic; it reflects ongoing contestation over citizenship, recognition, and redistribution within Nepal’s federal democratic framework.

Geopolitical Dimension

In the new geo-political contest, Nepal’s current election will be important for the future government in Kathmandu, where three external actors play an important role in the economic fronts, namely, India, China and the USA. It is difficult to predict whether the triangular dynamic between these major powers will move toward practical coexistence or intensifying competition. India and China share deep economic interdependence despite border tensions. Nepal has maintained close ties with India under the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2017, while the United States has expanded its engagement in South Asia through development partnerships, strategic dialogues, and infrastructure initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Voter Behavior Trends

In the 2022 Nepalese general election, the voter turnout was around 61.85 per cent of registered voters, marking a decline from the 68.66 per cent turnout in comparison in the 2017 polls. The turnout reflected a moderate level of public engagement amid growing political frustration, especially among younger voters.

The total number of seats in the house of representative is 275, of the total seats, 165 will be fielded by the First-past-the-post (FPTP) system, while the remaining 110 members of the House are elected through proportional representation.

The Election Commission stated that 3,484 candidates have filed nominations for the 165 constituencies across the country, of which 2,297 are affiliated with 68 political parties, while the remaining candidates are contesting as independents.

The figures show that women continue to be inadequately represented in party nominations. The Nepali Congress has fielded 11 women candidates, the CPN (UML) 10, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) 16, and the Nepali Communist Party 12. Notably, none of these parties has ensured that women comprise at least 33 per cent of their candidates. Nepal’s Constitution mandates that at least 33 per cent of the total members of the Federal Parliament must be women. This provision is rooted in Article 84(8) of the 2015 Constitution, which requires political parties to ensure that one-third of their parliamentary representation consists of women. If a party fails to reach this threshold through directly elected seats under the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, it must compensate through the Proportional Representation (PR) list to meet the constitutional requirement.

A total of 19 million people, out of Nepal’s roughly 30 million population, are eligible to vote on 5 March. Around one million new voters, mostly youth, have been added to the electoral rolls after Gen-Z protests. But the youth did not receive adequate nominations from prominent parties. Parties have prioritized experience over youth representation in candidate selection. This reflects on the state of the political parties, where they are unable to recognize the urgency for change.  

Important factors to watch in this election include urban–rural trends and the social dynamics that shape voting behaviors. During the Gen Z protests, it was evident that mobilization was largely concentrated in urban areas, while many rural regions remained relatively unaffected and less politically activated by the agitation.

Urban centers such as Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Biratnagar have shown greater receptivity to reformist and anti-establishment narratives, benefiting parties like the Rastriya Swatantra Party and independent candidates campaigning on governance reform and transparency. In contrast, rural constituencies often remain influenced by long-standing party networks, patronage systems, and local leadership ties. The youth vote and first-time voters form a crucial bloc, shaped by unemployment, migration pressures, and digital mobilizations; their turnout and political cohesion could significantly affect electoral outcomes.

Media reports suggest that while established parties emphasise experience and governance stability, newer entrants and younger candidates focus on anti-corruption, economic opportunity, and generational change to attract first-time and young voters.

Possible Scenarios for the new government

In the context of Nepal’s elections, it is difficult to predict whether one single political party would achieve the clear majority in the House of Representative. And possibly, post-poll coalitions will remain crucial for securing a majority seats to form the new government. There are four future scenarios that one could imagine.

1. 1. Rise of New Political Forces:
      If new political forces continue to mobilize voters around reform, transparency, and anti-corruption, they could emerge as strong contenders. Parties such as the Rastriya Swatantra Party have promised a new style of politics focused on accountability and generational change. If they expand their electoral base, they could challenge and potentially disrupt traditional power structures. In this case, Balen will be the main contender for the Prime Minister’s position, as his Party has already announced his name.
   2. Status Quo Coalition:
      A familiar coalition led by the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) could return to power. However, such an arrangement may continue the pattern of transactional coalition politics, with limited structural reforms and ongoing instability. In such situations, the Prime Ministerial candidate’s name will be the main point of contention, since Oli has resigned after the Gen Z protest, so Congress will give a hard time bargaining for the PM position. Congress President, Gagan Thapa, will be in the race as well.
   3. Left Realignment:
      Another possibility is a renewed alignment among major left parties, aiming to form a stronger executive framework. Multiple attempts have failed to unite left political forces, even after the Gen Z protests. Now, post-elections would likely be the best opportunity to project ideological unity and work to resolve internal rivalries. This should be the need for the people, where transformative action will gain the confidence of the masses. If required, they can also make alliances with regional parties.
   4. Fragmented Mandate:
      If no party secures a clear majority, mid-sized and regional actors will gain greater leverage. In such a scenario, coalition arithmetic will become as important an ideology in deciding the formation and stability of the next government.

 

The new government in Nepal will face the urgent task of ensuring political stability and restoring public confidence in parliamentary democracy. Transparency must be reflected in governance practices. Issues of corruption and nepotism need to be addressed and institutional reforms introduced to prevent public distrust and rebuild faith in the system. The urgent economic challenges will demand attention. With high youth unemployment, rising migration, and continued dependence on remittances, the government must focus on job creation, support for small and medium enterprises, and increased public investment in productive sectors. Managing inflation and restoring investor confidence will be equally important. On the external front, maintaining balanced relations with India, China, and the United States will remain crucial to safeguarding Nepal’s strategic autonomy while attracting development partnerships. Together, economic stabilization and careful diplomatic management will shape the credibility and durability of the new administration.

Tauqueer Ali Sabri works at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s South Asia Office in New Delhi.